Investment behavior, observable expectations, and internal funds: a comment on Cummins et al. (AER, 2006) by Alessandra Guariglia & Robert Carpenter
Investment behavior, observable expectations, and internal
funds: a comment on Cummins et al. (AER, 2006) 
Robert Carpenter Alessandra Guariglia
University of Maryland Baltimore County and Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond
University of Nottingham
Abstract
Cummins et al. (2006) construct a new measure of fundamentals, and show that the positive
cash flow effects typically found in investment-Q models disappear when traditional Q is
replaced with their new measure. Their results are not robust to small changes in their
specification or in the dataset used to estimate their model. The explanatory power of cash
flow does not disappear when replacing traditional Q with their new measure of Q; it is never
there to begin with. Investment’s lack of sensitivity to cash flow may be because their data is
biased towards firms with positive cash flow (it is negative for only 242 observations of
11431). This bias and our results mute their argument that the positive cash-flow effects
obtained in such models may reflect a failure to control properly for fundamentals rather than
the presence of financial constraints.
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The argument that the correlation between investment and cash flow can be interpreted as 
evidence supporting the financing constraints hypothesis has been at the center of a raging 
debate in recent years.
1 The debate largely centers on whether the observed average Q 
adequately proxies for fundamentals.
2 If it does not, cash flow might affect investment simply 
because it proxies for investment opportunities which are not properly accounted for by 
average Q, and not because firms face financial constraints upon investment.
3  
Cummins  et al. (2006) (hereafter Cummins et al.) contribute to the debate by 
proposing a direct estimate of the present discounted value of expected future profits that are 
derived from securities analysts’ earnings forecasts. Using a panel of US firms, they conclude 
that “the positive cash flow effects typically obtained in - investment-Q models – may reflect 
a failure to control properly for fundamentals and need not signal the presence of financial 
constraints” (p. 796-97) and that “… after controlling for fundamentals using analyst-based 
average Q, investment is insensitive to cash flow, even for firms thought to be liquidity 
constrained.”  (p. 796). 
  Their main argument is that the significance of cash flow in investment regressions is 
driven by its correlation with fundamentals that are not captured in the traditional measure of 
Q. To support their argument, it is critical that cash flow exhibits statistical significance (at 
least for firms without bond ratings) in a model including traditional Q, and that this 
significance disappears once fundamentals are properly accounted for with their new analyst-
based measure of Q. We evaluate their argument using the exact data and programs provided 
to the American Economic Review by Cummins et al. Our critical comments are focused on 
two points. 
First, while Cummins et al. find that cash flow is insignificant in the properly 
specified dynamic investment regression that uses their new measure of fundamentals, they 
do not report results for the same (also properly specified) model using the traditional Q. We 
show that cash flow is insignificant in the dynamic investment regressions for both traditional 
and analyst-based measures of Q. Since the significance of cash flow does not disappear 
when using their measure of fundamentals (as it is never there to begin with) the critical piece 
of their argument fails.  
Second, Cummins et al. report results from a static investment model that, they note, 
appears misspecified according to their reported test statistics. While the statistical 
significance of cash flow appears for traditional Q and disappears once their new measure of 
fundamentals is used, we show that these results are highly sensitive to a minor change to the 
choice of the sample’s time dimension. Specifically, they elect to restrict the length of their 
data and do not use all of the available observations in their data set for estimation. Once we 
relax this restriction, the statistical significance of cash flow again disappears for both 
measures of Q. We also relax the sample period restriction for the dynamic model, and we 
find no statistical role for cash flow using either measure of Q to control for fundamentals.  
We believe that cash flow’s inability to help explain investment in the data employed 
by Cummins et al., whichever measure of Q is used, undermines the central argument of their 
                                                 
1 A number of papers found that firms more likely to face liquidity constraints exhibit higher sensitivities of 
investment to cash flow (Fazzari et al., 1988; Hoshi et al., 1991). Other studies found exactly the opposite 
(Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Cleary, 1999), and others found no relationship between investment and cash flow 
(Erickson and Whited, 2000; Bond et al., 2004). 
2 Average Q is generally measured as the ratio between the market value of the firm and the replacement value 
of its capital stock.  
3 Traditional average Q can be a poor measure of fundamentals when share prices provide a noisy measure of 
the firm’s true value, resulting in a measurement error problem (Bond and Cummins, 2001).   2
paper. Moreover, the lack of statistical significance for cash flow in their data stands in stark 
contrast with most of the existing literature on investment and financial constraints. We 
conclude our analysis by using the evidence presented in Cummins et al.’s paper and their 
data to argue that the weak relationship between investment and cash flow that characterizes 
their data is probably due to the fact that their sample appears heavily biased towards 
financially healthy firms that would not normally be the focus of a study on the potential for 
financing constraints to affect investment.  
 
2.  Cash flow is insignificant in the dynamic model using traditional Q 
 
Cummins et al. present five tables of investment regressions estimates, focusing on three 
samples of firms: a full sample, a sub-sample of firms with bond ratings, and a sub-sample of 
unrated firms (which they argue are a priori more likely to face financial constraints).
4 
Their Table 2 presents estimates of static investment models, their Table 3, estimates 
of a dynamic model, and their Tables 4 to 6, a series of robustness tests, all relative to the 
static model. They use a GMM first-difference estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991), which 
controls for unobserved heterogeneity by estimating the relevant equations in first-
differences, and for endogeneity by using suitably lagged instruments. In each table, they 
present two sets of diagnostic results: the m2 test for the second-order autocorrelation of the 
first-differenced residuals, and the Sargan test of the over identifying restrictions. Both test 
the validity of the instruments and the specification of the model.  
In their Table 2, Cummins et al. show that when traditional average Q (“Q
E”) is used 
to proxy for fundamentals in a static investment model, cash flow significantly affects firms’ 
investment for the full sample and the sub-sample of unrated firms, but not for rated firms. 
This pattern of results is commonly thought to be consistent with the presence of financial 
constraints that affect the investment of unrated firms.  
It is crucial for their results and for the central argument in their paper that the cash 
flow effect disappears when their new measure of Q (“Q ˆ ”) is included in addition to or 
instead of Q
E.
5 They conclude that once fundamentals are properly accounted for, investment 
is no longer sensitive to cash flow. 
Except for the sub-sample of rated firms, the diagnostic tests presented in their Table 
2 suggest that the static investment model is mis-specified. To support their argument, they 
turn to dynamic specifications in Table 3, which according to the m2 and Sargan statistics are 
correctly specified for all samples.
6 In all the regressions presented in Table 3 (which all 
containQ ˆ ), cash flow is never a significant determinant of investment.  
Cummins et al. do not present estimates for any dynamic specification containing 
only Q
E and cash flow. This is an important omission because their argument depends on the 
disappearance of positive cash flow effects once the fundamentals that are mis-measured in 
                                                 
4 An anomalous feature of Cummins et al.’s data is that a total of 619 observations appear either in the rated or 
in the unrated sub-samples but do not appear in the full sample. 
5 Q ˆ  generally displays more precisely determined and larger coefficients than Q
E. Moreover, those models that 
include  Q ˆ  are better specified than those that do not. This suggests that Q ˆ  is indeed a better measure of 
fundamentals than Q
E. 
6 As the dynamic models are better specified than the static ones in Cummins et al., it is unclear why the 
robustness tests contained in Tables 4, 5, and 6 all refer to the latter. Bond and Cummins (2001) use the same 
dataset as Cummins et al. to evaluate the extent to which the empirical failings of the traditional Q model of 
investment can be attributed to the use of share prices to measure average Q. All of Bond and Cummins’ 
estimates are based on dynamic specifications. The same holds for Bond and Cummins (2000), and also for 
Bond et al. (2004) who carry out an analysis similar to Cummins et al.’s, but based on UK data.   3
Q
E are properly accounted for with Q ˆ . We fill this gap in Table 1 of this comment, where we 
use their data to estimate dynamic investment models containing Q
E and cash flow.
7 
Following their methodology as closely as possible, we use the investment to capital ratio and 
the cash flow to capital ratio lagged three and four times as instruments. With the single 
exception of the rated (i.e. unconstrained) firms, our results show that cash flow is never 
significant in these regressions. Thus, in a dynamic setting, cash flow never affects 
investment for the full sample and the sub-sample of unrated (i.e. constrained) firms, 
whichever measure of Q is employed to control for fundamentals. Cummins et al.’s central 
argument, that the effect of cash flow disappears once fundamentals are properly accounted 
for in their new measure of Q, fails in the dynamic specifications, as cash flow is not 
significant for either models containing traditional Q
E or their Q ˆ . Therefore, their conclusion 
that: “Our results highlight the fragility of the cash flow effects obtained in investment 
regressions that do not control for the apparent measurement error in Q
E” (p. 807) is difficult 
to interpret in a dynamic setting, as these cash flow effects are not observed in the first place. 
 
3.  The results in Cummins et al. are sensitive to the choice of sample period 
 
The data used by Cummins et al. span the years 1982-1999 for the full sample and the sub-
sample of unrated firms and the years 1986-1999 for the sub-sample of rated firms. It should 
be noted that the data provided to the American Economic Review only include the actual 
variables used for estimation and the year. They do not include information that can be used 
to identify the firms or their characteristics.
8 
To estimate their model, Cummins et al. choose to use only a portion of their data. 
They use only the years 1986-1999 for the full and unrated datasets, and 1990-1999, for the 
rated sample. They use a GMM first-difference estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991), with 
three and four lags of the investment to capital ratio and the cash flow to capital ratio selected 
as instruments.
9 Because the model is estimated in first-differences, one cross-sectional 
observation is automatically lost for each firm. When a dynamic model is estimated, an 
additional cross-section is lost. One would therefore expect the samples used in the 
estimation of the static models to span the years 1983-1999 for the full sample and the sub-
sample of unrated firms, and 1987-1999 for the sub-sample of rated firms. For the dynamic 
models one would expect the samples to span the years 1984-1999 and 1988-1999, 
respectively.  
While Cummins et al. do not explain their choice of shorter sub-samples to estimate 
their regressions, this choice could be justified by a willingness to exclude those cross-
sections for which instruments expected to be informative for estimating the slope parameters 
                                                 
7 Like Cummins et al.’s Table 3, our estimates are subject to the Common Factors (COMFAC) Restriction. 
Using  Q ˆ  and cash flow as regressors, we were able to exactly replicate the results for the full sample and the 
rated sub-sample reported in the left-hand side panel of Cummins et al.’s Table 3. However, for the unrated sub-
sample, we were unable to exactly replicate their results in spite of using the same data and programs (see 
bottom panel of our Table 1). 
8 As the data provided does not include a firm identifier, we were forced to back out the index variable by 
manually examining the data and the information contained in the Gauss auxiliary files provided by Cummins et 
al. Furthermore, the data only allow the replication of Tables 1 (except for the entry on sales) to 5 in Cummins 
et al. Table 6 cannot be replicated because the data provided relative to this Table contain variables that have 
different names than those in the other data sets and cannot be identified. Moreover, these data span the years 
1984-1995, while according to the output Tables provided by Cummins et al. in an earlier draft of their paper 
(Cummins et al., 2002), the sample used in Table 6 goes up to 1999. 
9 Cummins et al. justify this choice by stating that in most cases, the model’s overidentifying restrictions were 
rejected when using period t-2 variables as instruments (see their footnote 7, p. 803).   4
are unavailable. This would justify using samples spanning the periods 1985-1999 and 1989-
1999, still longer than the data that they chose to use. Excluding one additional cross-section, 
as they do, imposes the additional restriction that two lags of the chosen instruments are 
available for each cross-section. The GMM procedure does not require the exclusion of cross-
sections based on these criteria. If all cross-sections except the first (first two) are used in the 
estimation of the static (dynamic) investment models, time dummies are still available as 
instruments for the early cross-sections.  
Since restricting the data to omit the second to fourth cross-sections in the estimation 
of the static model is not required by GMM, we included them to see if Cummins et al.’s 
results are robust to allowing these additional cross sections of their data to be used to 
estimate the model. In Table 2 of this note, we use the extended sample period to estimate the 
static investment model for comparison to the results in the left-hand panel of their Table 2. 
Panel 1 presents our estimates for the periods 1983-1999 and 1987-1999, respectively for the 
full sample and the sub-sample of unrated firms, and the sub-sample of rated firms. For 
completeness, one might want to use the same extended sample to estimate both the static and 
dynamic models. So, panel 2 of Table 2 reports our estimates for the static model using the 
sample periods 1984-1999 and 1988-1999 (this is the same extended sample that we use to 
estimate the dynamic model in our Table 3).  
In the regressions with Q ˆ , the results are similar to those reported in the bottom left-
hand panel of Table 2 in Cummins et al.:  Q ˆ  generally attracts a positive and precisely 
determined coefficient, while the coefficient on cash flow is always poorly determined. 
However, contrary to their Table 2 results, cash flow is also insignificant in our specifications 
based on the extended samples, which include Q
E. Their conclusion that cash flow only 
affects investment when fundamentals are not properly accounted for is not robust to making 
use of all the observations available in their sample. 
  Table 3 of this note reports estimates of dynamic investment equations based on the 
extended samples (1984-1989; and 1988-1990). Once again, in these specifications cash flow 
is never significant, independent of whether Q
E or Q ˆ  is used as a regressor.  
The results in Cummins et al. are not robust to small changes in their specification or 
in the dataset used to estimate their model. When their model is estimated using all the 
available data, cash flow does not help explain investment, whichever measure of Q is 
employed, and whichever specification is considered. The same applies when a dynamic 
model is estimated, independent of whether a short or long data sample is used.
10 As a 
consequence, their data do not allow for an investigation of whether the positive cash flow 
effects obtained in models based on Q
E reflect the failure to properly control for 
fundamentals or whether they reflect the presence of financial constraints, as these positive 
cash flow effects are not observed in their data.  
 
4.  What explains the lack of a link between investment and cash flow? 
 
The robust link between investment and cash flow is well documented (see Hubbard, 1998; 
and Bond and Van Reenen, 2005, for surveys). The data employed by Cummins et al. is 
unusual in that this relationship is weak, or absent. What then, explains the lack of a robust 
relationship between the two that we have documented in this comment?  
The firms used by Cummins et al. are limited to those that are also followed by at 
least one I/B/E/S analyst. These firms selected for coverage by analysts are not random, and 
                                                 
10 This holds with the single exception of the investment for rated (i.e. unconstrained) firms, when a dynamic 
model with Q
E, based on Cummins et al.’s short sample is estimated.   5
are likely to be relatively profitable firms in industries of interest to I/B/E/S customers.
11 
Firms facing constraints are less likely to be followed by I/B/E/S analysts. In an earlier 
version of their paper, Cummins, Hassett, and Oliner (1997) themselves state: “Our results 
suggest that the constrained group excludes firms covered by securities analysts.” (p. 28). 
Cummins et al. provide excellent evidence showing that the sample used in estimation 
is comprised of profitable, financially healthy firms, for which cash flow is unlikely to 
significantly affect investment. Figure 1 in their paper displays analysts’ expected long-term 
earnings growth on the horizontal axis, and the five-year actual earnings growth on the 
vertical axis. Only five of 11431 total observations are characterized by negative expected 
long-term earnings growth. This indicates that the analysts expect positive long-run earnings 
growth for 99.96 percent firm-years of data. Further, the expected long-term growth for the 
full sample is 12.30 percent, while corresponding figures for the unrated and rated sub-
samples are respectively 13.62 percent and 10.52 percent.  
It is possible that analysts are overly optimistic about the firms’ expected long-term 
growth prospects: Cummins et al. themselves suggest that this is the case as “the median 
forecast exceeds realized growth by about 3 percentage points at an annual rate” (p. 801). 
However, it is evident from the data that the firms that they analyze display solid actual 
performance. Only 232 firm-years out of 11431 observations in the full sample display 
negative cash flow, i.e. 97.97 percent of all observations exhibit positive cash flow. Out of 
the 1066 firms, 99.34 percent display positive cash flow on average (only 7 firms have 
average negative cash flow). Cash flow is positive for 98.10 percent of firm-years in the 
unrated sub-sample (it is negative in only 103 of 5422 firm-years). Of the 642 unrated firms, 
640 have positive average cash flow (99.69 percent). In the rated sub-sample, 98.08 percent 
of all observations (82 of 4268) are characterized by positive cash flow, and 99.07 percent of 
all rated firms (425 of 429) display positive average cash flow. These numbers are in stark 
contrast with Cleary et al. (2007) who use annual Compustat financial statement data over the 
period 1980 to 1999 (eliminating data from regulated and financial industries) and find that 
23 percent of their observations display negative cash flow. Using Compustat data over the 
period 1982-1999, we also find that, in fact, slightly more than one-quarter of the 
observations display negative cash flow and more than one-third of firms display negative 
average cash flow. Cummins et al.’s sample appears therefore heavily biased towards 
financially healthy firms that would not normally be the focus of a study on the potential for 
financing constraints to affect investment. 
The extent to which the industrial composition of the sample affects the results in 
Cummins et al. is unclear, and may also partly explain why they find that cash flow has very 
little explanatory power for investment, in contrast to much prior research. The bulk of the 
studies in this area have in fact focused on manufacturing firms.
12 Their paper is not limited 
to manufacturing, which makes comparing their results to the literature more complex. 
However, no information about firms’ industry is provided in the data files they made 
available to the American Economic Review, and we cannot investigate this issue.  
 
 
                                                 
11 As stated in Das et al. (2006): “…analysts tend to shy away from issuing any public opinions when their true 
expectations are unfavourable and they are more likely to provide coverage for firms about which their true 
expectations are favourable.” (p. 2). This statement is supported by the fact that according to Table 1 in 
Cummins  et al., the median value of sales in their dataset is 1093 millions of 1996 dollars, while the 
corresponding value in the Compustat universe is just 459. These numbers suggest that the analyst tend to 
follow larger firms, which are less likely to face financial constraints. 
12 A few exceptions are Schaller (1993) who estimated investment equations for manufacturing and non-
manufacturing Canadian firms; and Cleary (1999) and Cleary et al. (2007) who estimated investment equations 
for the entire US economy.   6
5. Conclusions 
 
Cummins et al. make a valuable contribution to the literature by providing a technique, based 
on securities analysts’ earning forecasts, which improves the measurement of firms’ 
fundamentals. Their measure performs better than traditional Q: once included in investment 
regressions, it displays larger and more precisely determined coefficients and improves the 
general specification of the model.  
However, they do not provide a satisfactory answer to the questions that can be raised 
about the interpretation of cash flow effects in investment regressions that use traditional Q to 
control for fundamentals. Specifically, they suggest that cash flow plays an important role in 
those regressions simply because it picks up the effects of fundamentals which are not 
properly accounted by traditional Q, and not because of financial constraints. The central 
argument of their paper is based on their findings that once fundamentals are measured using 
analysts’ earnings forecasts, cash flow is no longer significant. This argument is not 
convincing as in their paper cash flow generally does not affect investment, whatever 
measure of Q is used. Thus cash flow's explanatory power does not disappear when their new 
measure of fundamentals is used, as in their data cash flow has no explanatory power to begin 
with.
13 
We argue that because analysts do not follow all firms, Cummins et al. base their 
analysis on a dataset essentially comprised of financially healthy firms with good growth 
prospects which are unlikely to display positive sensitivities of investment to cash flow. 
Controlling for fundamentals in firm level data using analysts-based measures of Q is 
therefore unlikely to become the general practice at this time. Furthermore, it is not clear that 
the problems of poorly measured fundamentals can be resolved by substituting an analyst-
based assessment of equity value for the assessment from the stock market. One can fairly 
question why a few analysts would be better than all the stock market participants in 
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Table 1: GMM estimates of dynamic first-differenced investment equations 
based on Cummins et al.’s data samples 
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Observations  7167 2552 2854 
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Observations  7167 2552 2854 
Number of firms  1066  429  642 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-difference of the ratio of investment to capital (I/K)it for firm i at time 
t. (CF/K)it represents the cash flow to capital ratio of firm i at time t; Qit
E, Tobin’s Q; and Qit
ˆ , Cummins et al.’s 
alternative measure of investment opportunities based on analysts’ earnings forecasts. The model is estimated 
after imposing the common factor (COMFAC) restriction. Year dummies are included (but not reported) in all 
specifications. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The instrumental variables are period t-3 and t-4 values 
of (I/K) and (CF/K), as well as year dummy variables. The Sargan test of the overidentifying restrictions is 
asymptotically distributed as χ
2
(n-p), where n is the number of instruments and p is the number of parameters. 
The m2 test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals is asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The COMFAC test is asymptotically distributed as χ
2
r , where r is 
the number of non-linear common factor restrictions. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level. ** 
indicates significance at the 5 percent level. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. Sample period: 
1986-1999 for full and unrated samples; 1990-1999 for rated sample. All regressions were estimated using the 
exact data and programs provided to the American Economic Review by Cummins et al.   9
 
Table 2: GMM estimates of static first-differenced investment equations 
based on extended samples 
 
Panel 1: Sample period: 1983-1999 for full and unrated samples; 1987-1999 for rated sample 
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(CF/K)it  0.122 0.041 0.037 
  (0.089) (0.065) (0.100) 
     
m2 p-value 0.00  0.008  0.00 
Sargan p-value 0.00  0.002  0.008 
Observations 10365  3839  4780 
Number of firms  1066  429  642 
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(CF/K)it -0.021  0.008  -0.035 
  (0.100) (0.068) (0.111) 
     
m2 p-value 0.00  0.013  0.00 
Sargan p-value  0.008 0.104 0.088 
Observations 10365  3839  4780 
Number of firms  1066  429  642 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-difference of the ratio of investment to capital (I/K)it for firm i at time 
t. (CF/K)it represents the cash flow to capital ratio of firm i at time t; Qit
E, Tobin’s Q; and Qit
ˆ , Cummins et al.’s 
alternative measure of investment opportunities based on analysts’ earnings forecasts. Year dummies are 
included (but not reported) in all specifications. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The instrumental 
variables are period t-3 and t-4 values of (I/K) and (CF/K), as well as year dummy variables. * indicates 
significance at the 10 percent level. ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level. *** indicates significance at 
the 1 percent level. All regressions were estimated using the exact data and programs provided to the American 
Economic Review by Cummins et al. Also see Notes to Table 1.   10
Panel 2: Sample period: 1984-1999 for full and unrated samples; 1988-1999 for rated sample 
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(CF/K)it  0.140 0.074 0.072 
  (0.089) (0.066) (0.103) 
     
m2 p-value 0.00  0.019  0.00 
Sargan p-value  0.00 0.00 0.012 
Observations  9299 3410 4138 
Number of firms  1066  429  642 
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(CF/K)it -0.022  0.033  0.003 
  (0.103) (0.069) (0.109) 
     
m2 p-value 0.00  0.029  0.027 
Sargan p-value  0.033 0.067 0.059 
Observations  9299 3410 4138 
Number of firms  1066  429  642 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-difference of the ratio of investment to capital (I/K)it for firm i at time 
t. (CF/K)it represents the cash flow to capital ratio of firm i at time t; Qit
E, Tobin’s Q; and Qit
ˆ , Cummins et al.’s 
alternative measure of investment opportunities based on analysts’ earnings forecasts. Year dummies are 
included (but not reported) in all specifications. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The instrumental 
variables are period t-3 and t-4 values of (I/K) and (CF/K), as well as year dummy variables. * indicates 
significance at the 10 percent level. ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level. *** indicates significance at 
the 1 percent level. All regressions were estimated using the exact data and programs provided to the American 
Economic Review by Cummins et al. Also see Notes to Table 1.   11
Table 3: GMM estimates of dynamic first-differenced investment equations 
based on extended samples 
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Observations  9299 3410 4138 
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Observations  9299 3410 4138 
Number of firms  1066  429  642 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-difference of the ratio of investment to capital (I/K)it for firm i at time 
t. (CF/K)it represents the cash flow to capital ratio of firm i at time t; Qit
E, Tobin’s Q; and Qit
ˆ , Cummins et al.’s 
alternative measure of investment opportunities based on analysts’ earnings forecasts. The model is estimated 
after imposing the common factor (COMFAC) restriction. Year dummies are included (but not reported) in all 
specifications. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The instrumental variables are period t-3 and t-4 values 
of (I/K) and (CF/K), as well as year dummy variables. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level. ** 
indicates significance at the 5 percent level. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. Sample period: 
1984-1999 for full and unrated samples; 1988-1990 for rated sample. All regressions were estimated using the 
exact data and programs provided to the American Economic Review by Cummins et al. Also see Notes to Table 
1. 
 
 